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Contractual Dualism, Market Power and Informality
* 
 
Two stylized representations are often found in the academic and policy literature on 
informality and formality in developing countries. The first is that the informal (or unregulated) 
sector is more competitive than the formal (or regulated) sector. The second is that contract 
enforcement is easier in the formal sector than in the informal sector, precisely because the 
formal sector comes under the purview of state regulation. The basic contention of this paper 
is that these two representations are not compatible with each other. We develop a search-
theoretic model of contractual dualism in the labor market where the inability to commit to 
contracts in the informal sector leads to employer market power in equilibrium, while an 
enforced minimum wage in the formal sector provides employers with a commitment 
technology but which reduces their market power in equilibrium. The contributions of this 
paper are three-fold. It (i) provides the micro-underpinnings for endogenous determination of 
employer market power in the formal and informal sectors due to contractual dualism in the 
two sectors, (ii) offers a unified and coherent setup whereby a host of salient features of 
developing country labor markets can be explained together, and (iii) places the original 
Stiglerian prescription of the optimal (unemployment minimizing) minimum wage in the 
broader context of labor markets where formal job creation is costly, and where formal 
employment, informal employment, and unemployment co-exist. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J3, J6, O17 
  





Nancy H. Chau  
Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management 
Cornell University 
Ithaca, NY 14853  
USA 
E-mail: hyc3@cornell.edu   
 
                                                 
* We thank Gary Fields, Santiago Levy, and seminar participants at Cornell, the Federal Reserve Bank 
at St. Louis, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) for 
helpful comments and stimulating discussions. 1 Introduction
Economic activities in developing countries are often classied as falling into either a state
regulated sphere or an unregulated sphere.1 The labels \formal" and \informal" are often
attached to these spheres or sectors, it being understood of course that in reality there is a con-
tinuum rather than a dichotomy. The dualistic formulation is nevertheless useful conceptually
in capturing key characteristics for analytical or policy discourse. The literature on formality
and informality is large and diverse, with many controversies, even down to whether the terms
themselves are appropriate.2 However, two features of these sectors, or rather two contrasts
between them, seem to be generally accepted in dierent parts of the literature.
First the informal sector is seen as being competitive, with no market power or dominance
by a group of actors or by one side of the market, particularly in the labor market; the formal
sector, on the other hand, is seen as having elements of market power, whether it be large rms
or labor unions. Such characterizations are a staple of the development economics literature,
and have distinctive policy conclusions targeted toward the lack of competition in the formal
sector. Reducing union power in formal sector labor markets, or removing minimum wage
legislation or other regulation in these markets, are typical policy conclusions that ow from
such a perspective.3
Second, enforcement of contracts is seen as being particularly dicult in the informal
sector. This in turn leads to calls for extending the realm of formal regulation and law, which
is seen as being able to \unlock the economic potential" of the informal sector. Major policy
initiatives, such as property titling in urban slums, ow from these initiatives.4
The basic contention of this paper is that these two views { stated in sharp form as (i)
the informal sector is competitive and (ii) contract enforcement is not possible in the informal
sector { are incompatible. Indeed, we argue that the lack of contract enforcement leads to
1The pervasiveness of the unregulated sphere has been well documented. For example, Schneider and Enste
(2000) nds, using a multitude of methods, that the average size of the informal sector as a percentage of GDP
ranges from 23 percent for transition countries to 39 percent for developing countries.
2See Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom (2006) and Kanbur (2009) for the latest in many surveys of the
literature.
3For example, The Economist (September 11 - 17, 2010), in its survey of Latin America, notes: \Thanks
largely to baroque regulation, half the labour force toils in the informal economy, unable to reap the productivity
gains that come from technnology and greater scale." See also Levy (2007). A classic exposition of such dualism
is to be found in Harris and Todaro (1970).
4The best known proponent of this position is de Soto (2003).
1the development of market power in equilibrium. We establish these claims by focusing on a
model of the labor market where wages are paid after the work is done, but employers cannot
commit to wage contracts. There is then a holdup problem because workers cannot be sure
they will get paid for the work they have done. We argue that equilibrium is then characterized
by employer market power even with free entry, because any attempts by newcomers to bid
labor away with higher wages cannot be credible in the absence of enforceable contracts. In
this setting, third party enforcement, such as a state enforced minimum wage oor, alleviates
the holdup problem and oers a de facto commitment device leading to greater eciency, and
contributes to greater equity as well.
Consider now a situation where the government's writ does not run throughout the
economy, and rms can choose between being in the regulated and the unregulated sector. In
the unregulated portion of the economy, wage contracts are not enforceable by third parties,
so that only those contracts that are self-enforcing are viable. In the regulated sector, rms
face costly job creation / registration costs, in addition to an enforced minimum wage. In the
conventional view of the formal sector, these regulations are a costly burden for rms. But in
our model, we oer an alternative interpretation, where signing up as a formal rm signals an
employer's (state enforced) commitment to pay a high wage.
With this structure we describe and characterize an equilibrium where the division of
activity between the informal and formal sectors is determined endogenously. We show that
market power of employers is greater in the informal sector than in the formal sector { informal
is less competitive than formal despite, or actually because of, non-enforcement of contracts.
The importance of limited commitment in determining labor market outcomes has been
discussed in a number of other settings. For example, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) studies the
implications of inability on the part of workers to make a prior commitment on eort. Chari,
Restuccia and Urrutia (2005) sets out to determine the implications of worker's inability to
commit to stay on the job. Ramey and Watson (1997) examines the implications of two-sided
limited commitments on the part of both workers and employers to refrain from shirking. The
power of these and related studies lies in their ability to provide a coherent explanation for
observed salient features of labor markets that are not easily explained in a setting otherwise free
2from commitment problems,5 as well as in their ability to oer innovative policy conclusions.6
What is particularly notable here, however, is that the focus of this earlier literature
and the associated policy conclusions typically target developed country labor markets. In this
paper, we propose a model of contractual dualism in the formal and informal sectors that yields
predictions consistent with ve salient features of developing country labor markets that have
received a good deal of attention:7
 Given skill level, formal sector wages are higher than in the informal sector.
 Some wages in the informal sector are above the formal sector minimum wage despite no
requirement for them to be so.
 The national wage distribution will have a spike at the minimum wage.
 Co-movements of subminimum wages and the regulated minimum wage have been demon-
strated, including positive correlations, no signicant correlations, and negative correla-
tions (Card and Krueger 1995, Lemos 2004, Baanante 2005, Strobl and Walsh 2001,
Gindling and Terrell, 2002).8
 Skill levels in the formal and informal sectors will overlap, but the average skill level is
higher in the formal sector (Maloney 1999, 2004, Thomas 1992, Gong and Van Soest 2002
and Gong, Van Soest and Villagomez 2004).
5Some of these include the existence of equilibrium unemployment (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), seniority based
wages, high separation rates for low skilled workers (Chari, Restuccia and Urrutia (2005), and countercyclical
job destruction without real wage rigidities (Ramey and Watson (1997)).
6Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) proposes a tax on prots to fund wage subsidies, Chari, Restuccia and Urrutia
proposes raising ring costs to increase duration of employer-worker matches, and Ramey and Watson (1997)
provides the rationale for a severence Tax / Tax on rms following good states, to nance rms following bad
states.
7Bargain and Kwenda (2010) demonstrates the existence of an informal wage penalty using evidence from
Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa. Charlot, Malherbet and Terra (2011) likewise presents evidence from Brazil
indicating a wage premium in the formal sector after controlling for individual characteristics. For studies
that present kernel density plots and / or wage histograms of dispersed subminimum wage distribution, see for
example, Bell (1997) for Colombia, Maloney and Nunez (2004) for eight Latin American countries, Cardoso and
Portugal (2005) for Portugal, Terrell and Gindling (2006) for Honduras, Strobl and Walsh (2001) for Trinidad
and Tobago, Lemos (2004) for both the formal and informal sectors in Brazil. These studies likewise demonstrate
wage dualism between the formal and informal sectors, the overlap of wage distributions in the two sectors, over
compliance in the informal sector, and a spike of the wage distribution at the minimum wage.
8Our model also predicts an inverted-U shaped relationship between the minimum wage and employment.
Empirical studies on the employment eects of higher minimum wages have likewise generated mixed results to
date. See for example, Fanzylber (2001) and Carneiro and Corseuil (2001), showing positive employment eect
of a minimum wage on the informal sector. Maloney and Nunez (2004), for example, nds the employment eect
to be negative. Other studies nd no signicant relationship (Lemos 2009, Gindling and Terrell 2007).
3In terms of policy implications, we propose a simple formula that revises the Stiglerian
prescription of an optimal (unemployment minimizing) minimum wage. The original prescrip-
tion stipulates a skill-specic minimum wage, to be set at the marginal value product of laborers
in an otherwise competitive labor market (Stigler 1946). Our extension of the optimal minimum
wage formula { in a setting with endogenous employer market power induced by contractual
dualism in the formal and the informal sectors { takes the Stiglerian prescription as a special
case, and more generally incorporates the cost of creating a formal sector job as a key determi-
nant of the height of such a minimum wage. Importantly, as has been recently demonstrated
in Djankov et al. (2002), these costs of formal sector regulation can be signicant. In the
context of our analysis, the implication is thus that the corresponding downward adjustment
required in setting the unemployment minimizing minimum wage relative to the marginal value
product of labor will accordingly be substantial. Put another way, the cost of formal sector
job creation puts a strict limit on the extent to which a government enforced minimum wage
can simultaneously achieve eciency (raising employment) and distributional (raising wages)
gains.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are three-fold. It (i) provides the micro-
underpinnings for endogenous determination of employer market power in the formal and in-
formal sectors due to contractual dualism in the two sectors, (ii) oers a unied and coherent
setup whereby a host of salient features of developing country labor markets can be explained
together, and (iii) places the original Stiglerian prescription of the optimal (unemployment
minimizing) minimum wage in the broader context of labor markets where formal job creation
is costly, and where formal employment, informal employment, and unemployment co-exist.
This paper is also related to a large literature on the informal economy. Fields (2006)
provides an excellent survey of multisectoral models of developing country labor markets where
the wage, formal and informal employment, in addition to unemployment implications of policy
shifts can be ascertained. It is noteworthy that this class of models typically assumes that
labor markets in both the formal and informal sectors are competitive, thus eectively ruling
out unemployment-reducing and equity-improving minimum wage reforms  a la Stigler (1946).
Our model is search theoretic in nature. There has been a surge in attention given to
models of the informal sector using a search theoretic approach where match frictions play an
4important role. For example, Zenou (2008) examines the employment impacts of unemploy-
ment benets, wage subsidies, and entry costs in the formal sector, and does so in a setting
which assumes a frictionless informal labor market, and a formal labor market characterized by
search friction and unemployment. Albrecht, Navarro and Vroman (2011) presents a search and
matching model of a regulated formal and an unregulated informal sector where the size, as well
as skill composition of the formal and informal workforce adjust endogenously to severance and
payroll taxes. Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) is likewise concerned with the skill composition of the
formal and informal workforce, as well as the puzzling increase in size of the shadow economy
despite improvements in detection technologies against tax evasion. Charlot, Malherbet and
Terra (2011) departs further from the standard search theoretic setup by permitting product
market price setting behavior by formal and informal rms, and examines the impact of en-
try costs and workers' bargaining power on employment, unemployment and wage bargaining
outcomes in the formal and informal sectors.
In our paper, search related labor market frictions will likewise be one of the building
blocks of the model. But departing from these existing studies, our paper introduces a con-
tractual view to wage and employer market power formation in the formal and the informal
labor markets. We demonstrate that such a setting provides a coherent basis for understanding
a wide variety of salient features related to dierences in skill composition, wage distribution,
and regulation compliance commonly observed in the formal and informal sectors of developing
countries that cannot be easily explained together. In terms of policy implications, this paper
provides a simple formula which links the cost of job creation in the formal sector, known to
be substantial in many developing countries, and the size of the optimal minimum wage.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the basic search framework
where all labor contracts are subject to a No Reneging Constraint (NRC). A steady state
equilibrium where formal and informal sectors co-exist is then characterized, and the features
of this equilibrium are explored. Section 3 considers the special case of a non intervention
benchmark, where there is no minimum wage in the economy. In this case, the model collapses
to a single sector. It is shown that in this equilibrium, employers have market power despite
free entry, with consequent ineciency of outcomes. Section 4 focuses on minimum wage policy
with contractual dualism. We show how the equilibrium changes with the minimum wage, and
5furthermore the lowest minimum wage that eliminates employer market power in fact coincides
with the lowest minimum wage that minimizes unemployment. Section 5 concludes with some
observations on further research.
2 The Model
Let time t be discrete, with t = 0;1;2;:::;1. We consider a labor market with a large pool of
workers (  N). The skill level of workers is parameterized by a  0, and the exogenously given







where yt is income at time t and workers' discount factor is given by N 2 (0;1). Let  u < a
denote unemployment income.
Let M(a) denote the endogenous number of employers in search of skill type a workers.






over the innite horizon, where E denotes employers' discount factor.
An employer can choose between operating in the formal or the informal sector. A match
between an employer and a skill type a worker in either sector generates revenue a per period.
The size of every rm in this setting is exactly one worker.9
We say that production takes place in the formal sector if two conditions are met. First,
a xed cost of formal job creation fa applies, covering the cost of worker search, the cost of
registration, and the cost of overcoming any other bureaucratic roadblocks that undermine job
creation. We take the xed cost of entry to be increasing in the value of the nal output a,
where f is a strictly positive fraction.10
Second, formal employers obey a government mandated minimum wage  w. We consider
minimum wages in the range ( u;a). The minimum wage is strictly enforced by third party
9We thus abstract from variations in rm size as shown in Rauch (1991) for example, and focus instead on
limited commitment, market power, as well as the ve salient skill composition and wage distribution features
of developing economies { features that have yet to receive systematic treatment in the literature.
10In section 4, we discuss the relevance of f both in empirical studies of the cost of formal sector entry, and
in the determination of an optimal minimum wage in this setup.
6government enforcement agencies. The expected wage bill upon hiring a skill type a worker at
contracted formal sector wage wf is:
we
f(a;wf;  w) = wf + maxf  w   wf;0g: (1)
The creation of an informal sector job also involves a xed cost ia, where 0 < i < f,
reecting the cost savings of operating informally. The absence of ocial registration however
renders the minimum wage harder to enforce in the informal sector. Let q 2 [0;1) be the
government enforcement intensity. The expected wage bill at any contracted informal sector
wage wi is
we
i(a;wi;  w) = wi + q maxf  w   wi;0g: (2)
2.1 Search Friction with a Formal and an Informal Sector
At the start of each time period, an employer in search of a worker of skill level a chooses and
proposes an expected oer we to one of U(a) number of a type unemployed job seekers chosen
at random. Let F(we;a;  w) be the cumulative distribution function of such employer oers
conditional on skill type a. F(we;a;  w) is taken to be inclusive of both formal and informal
wage oers so long as they are targeted towards workers of skill type a. We assume in addition
that a job oer lasts at most one period, and there is no possibility of recall of previously
unaccepted oers.
Each job seeker rates any and all oers received, selects the best, and rejects the rest.
We assume that search friction prevents the job seeker from receiving the full set of oers.
Instead, the likelihood that an unemployed job seeker is met with z = 0;1;2;::: oers is given
by a Poisson distribution with parameter (a) = M(a)=U(a), or, Pr(z; (a)) = e (a)(a)z=z!
(Mortensen 2003). Since the distribution of each such wage oer is F(we;a;  w), the cumulative
distribution of the maximal oer received is:





= e (a)(1 F(we;a;  w)): (3)
H(we;a;  w) gives the probability that the best oer that a skill type a worker receives is less
than we. From an employer's perspective, H(we;a;  w) is thus the likelihood of consummating
a match with a skill type a worker by oering we.
7Workers
At any time t, there are two groups of workers: those who are unemployed U(a), and those
who are employed N(a) =  N(a)   U(a). Among employed workers, there is in addition an
endogenous division between informal (Ni(a)) and formal sector workers (Nf(a)). By denition
of workers' preference W, each worker cares only about the discounted utility of take home
income yt, but not the sector from which this income is derived per se. Thus, we denote
W(we;a;  w) as the value function of an employed worker given we, and Wu(a;  w) the value
function of an unemployed worker.
An employed worker at time period t receives his expected income we, and faces two
possible prospects in the following period at t + 1: (i) continue on with the same job, or (ii)
transition into unemployment. We assume that  > 0 is an exogenous probability of separation.
Thus
W(we;a;  w) = we + N [Wu(a;  w) + (1   )W(we;a;  w)]
=
we + NWu(a;  w)
1   bN
: (4)
bN = N(1   ) henceforth denotes the separation risk adjusted discount factor. The value
function of an unemployed skill type a worker is given by:
Wu(a;  w) =  u + N
Z
x
maxfW(x;a;  w);Wu(a;  w)gdH(x;a;  w) (5)
where the worker receives his unemployment income  u > 0 in the current period, and anticipates
the choice between staying unemployed, or accepting his best oer in the following period.11
From (4), W(we;a;  w) is monotonically increasing in we. Thus let we
r be the reservation
expected take home pay { the lowest pay we such that a worker is better o working than
remaining unemployed:
we
r(a) = minfwe(a)jWe(we;a;  w)  Wu(a;  w)g: (6)
11Though we will refer to  u as unemployment income throughout this paper, we note here that  u may also be
interpreted as self-employment income, including any relevant government assistance available to unemployed /
self-employed individuals.
8By monotonicity in (4), we
r(a) is uniquely dened given Wu(a;  w). We have thus12

















r(a;  w))dH(x;a;  w): (7)
The reservation oer we
r(a;  w) implicitly solves (7). Intuitively, we
r(a;  w) is equal to the unem-
ployment income, plus the (separation risk adjusted) discounted income gains that an unem-
ployed worker can expect upon delaying employment for one more period. With this in mind,
we henceforth normalize  u at zero.
Employers
There are two groups of employers at any time t. Those already employing an existing worker,
and those seeking a new worker. For employers in the rst group employing a skill type a
worker, let Vj(we;a) denote the associated value function for an employer in sector j = i;f.13
Given any accepted oer we, the employer earns current period expected prot a   we, and
faces two possibilities in the following period:14 continuation of the same labor contract we for
one more period, at expected value V (we;a) with probability 1   , or separation otherwise,
with zero prots thereafter. Thus:





where bE  E(1 ). For employers in search of a worker at skill level a oering we  we
r(a;  w),
the associated value functions (V o
i and V o
f ) account for the match likelihood H(we;a;  w), and
12Equation (7) follows from (4) - (6), where
W(w
e







u(a;  w) , W
u(a;  w) = w
e
r=(1   N):
In other words, the lifetime discounted value of a stream of income equaling the reservation oer w
e
r gives the
value function of the unemployed. Substituting the above to (4) gives (7).
13From (1) and (2), the implied contracted wage wf in the formal sector solves w
e(a) = wf +maxf  w wf;0g,
while the same expected wage w
e in the informal sector implies a contracted wage wi that solves w
e = wi +
q maxf  w   wi;0g given government enforcement intensity q.
14To see this, note that given the probability of detection q, current period expected prot of an informal
employer is simply a   w   q maxf  w   w;0g, or, a   w
e as stated.
9the job creation costs ia and fa in the two sectors:
V o
i (we;a;  w) = H(we;a;  w)Vi(we;a)   ia;
V o
f (we;a;  w) = H(we;a;  w)Vf(we;a)   fa: (9)
Armed with (8) and (9), the decision problem of an employer is two-fold: (i) choose
between oering a formal or an informal sector job, and (ii) select an expected take home pay
we to oer. Answers to these questions will give the equilibrium wage distribution at each skill
level, the endogenous division of informal and formal sector jobs along the wage distribution,
and the associated reservation wage from (7). To these ends, we proceed next to discuss the
implications of three sets of demand side constraints facing employers in their wage oer choices.
2.2 Free Entry and Self-Enforcing Contracts
Minimum Wage Constraint (MWC)
This rst constraint establishes the minimum expected oer that an employer will need to make
in the presence of a minimum wage. For all non-negative contracted formal wage wf  0,
we = wf + maxf  w   wf;0g   w  wMW
f (  w):
Not surprisingly, with a perfectly enforced minimum wage, formal expected wage oer is no
less than the minimum wage. Similarly in the informal sector, for all non-negative contracted
wage wi  0,
we = wi + q maxf  w   wi;0g  q  w  wMW
i (  w)
and the informal expected wage oer should never fall below the government enforced expected
wage q  w. Figure 1a illustrates.
Free Entry Constraint (FEC)
With free entry, the highest expected wage oer that an employer can aord must at least
sustain non-negative expected prots, V o
i and V o
f . Thus, let wFE
i (a) and wFE
f (a) be these skill-
specic maximal oers respectively in i and f. Suppose that the highest oer we among skill
type a workers is made in the informal sector at wFE
i (a), the match likelihood of the highest
10oer is H(wFE
i ;a;  w) = 1 for there exist by denition no other oers that outmatch wFE
i (a).
The associated value function is thus:
V o
i (wFE




  ia; , wFE
i (a) = [bE + (1   bE)(1   i)]a  ia: (10)
By similar reasoning if instead the best oer among skill type a workers occurs in the formal
sector at wFE
f (a), it follows now that H(wFE
f ;a;  w) = 1, and
V o
f (wFE




  fa; , wFE
f (a) = [bE + (1   bE)(1   f)]a  fa: (11)
Clearly, the higher the skill level, the higher the maximal oers wFE
i (a) and wFE
f (a). In both
sectors, the highest wage consistent with zero expected prots is a fraction of the marginal
productivity a in the presence of strictly positive job creation costs. Furthermore, since job
creation cost is strictly higher in the formal sector, we have
Proposition 1 With free entry in the formal and the informal sector,
wFE
f (a)  wFE
i (a):
Higher job creation cost in the formal sector thus translates to lower wage oers when the free
entry constraint binds. This puts formal sector employer at a disadvantageous position in their
bid for workers. This is illustrated in Figure 1b, which plots wFE
f (a) and wFE
i (a) across skill
types.
No Reneging Constraint (NRC)
Unless there is perfect enforcement by third party agencies, credible labor contracting must
also be self-enforcing. We identify two \No Reneging Constraints" (NRC), one for each sector.
The NRC ensures that an employer prefers paying the contracted wage over reneging on a labor
contract that has been struck. We assume that a refusal to honor the contracted payment leads
to a worker initiated termination of the employment relation.15 Thus, a wage oer we targeting
a skill type a worker satises the NRC in the informal sector if and only if
Vi(we;a) = a   we + E(1   )Vi(we;a)  a   q maxf  w   0;0g = a   q  w
15In a steady state, an employer that reneges in one period will renege in subsequent periods. A punishment
that leads to employment termination is rational from the workers' point of view for W
u(a)  0 from (5).
11where a   q minf  w;ag is the expected prot of a reneging employer, who derives labor a
from the contracted worker, pays minf  w;ag only if discovered by enforcement agencies (with
probability q), and otherwise refuse to pay the contracted wage w consistent with the oer
we = w + q maxf  w   w;0g.
Similarly, the NRC in the formal sector requires
Vf(we;a) = a   we + E(1   )Vf(we;a)  a   maxf  w   0;0g = a    w
where a    w is the expected prot of a reneging formal sector employer, with government
mandated minimum wage at  w > 0.
The maximal self-enforcing oers that the two sectors can deliver are:
wNR
i (a;  w) = maxfwejVi(we;a)  a   q maxf  w   0;0gg = bEa + (1   bE)q  w (12)
wNR
f (a;  w) = maxfwejVf(we;a)  a   q maxf  w   0;0gg = bEa + (1   bE)  w: (13)
Note that wNR
i (a;  w) and wNR
f (a;  w) are now weighted averages of the full output per worker
a, and the expected government enforced wage, q  w and  w respectively in the two sectors.
Intuitively, and in the absence of a minimum wage, wNR
i = wNR
f is but a fraction bE of the
marginal productivity a, which equates the one time prot of a reneging employer (a), with
the discounted prot of a non-reneging employer (a   wNR
i )=(1   bE) = (a   wNR
f )=(1   bE)
over the innite horizon. Introducing the minimum wage raises wNR
f disproportionately more,
since the lowest expected wage that even a reneging employer will be enforced by law to pay is
 w in the formal sector, and q  w in the informal. Put dierently, the potential wage gains from
reneging, all else equal, is strictly less in the formal sector thanks to government enforcement
of the minimum wage.
The NRC accordingly marks all wage oers higher than wNR
i and wNR
f as outside of the
range of feasible wages, because workers harboring rational expectations will reject these high
wage promises as not credible. These maximal wages are illustrated in Figure 1c, from which
it immediately follows that
Proposition 2 With self-enforcing labor contracting in the formal and informal sectors,
wNR
f (a;  w) > wNR
i (a;  w):
12In addition, both wNR
f (a;  w) and wNR
i (a;  w) are non-decreasing functions of  w, with
wNR
f (a;  w)   w; and wNR
i (a;  w)  q  w:
In sharp contrast to the FEC, Figure 1c shows that the maximal wage in the formal sector
now dominates that of the informal sector, thanks specically to better enforcement of the
minimum wage in the formal sector. Moreover, the self-enforcing maximal wage oers are
higher than the government enforced expected wages:  w and q  w in the two sectors. The key
insight here is that the prots of those who renege (a    w and a   q  w respectively whenever
a >  w) are kept in check by government enforcement of the minimum wage. This eectively
enhances the employer's ability to sign self-enforcing labor contracts at wages even higher than
the government enforced  w and q  w.16
2.3 Contractual Dualism and Wage Dualism
The juxtaposition of the MWC, the FEC, and the NRC determines the demand side of this
labor market accommodating both informal and formal jobs. Between the two types of jobs,
the key distinguishing feature is the intensity with which the government is able to impact
the self-enforcement of private contracts by enforcing the minimum wage. Henceforth, we say
that contractual dualism prevails whenever the enforcement intensities in the two sectors are
suciently divergent. Specically:
Denition 1 The labor market exhibits contractual dualism if and only if the discounted ex-
pected prots of an informal employer with a self-enforcing oer wNR
i (a;  w) is always strictly
positive: Vi(wNR
i (a;  w);a)   ia > 0, or equivalently17
q < (1   i):
Note that with full enforcement in the formal sector, the corresponding value function of a
formal employer,  fa, is of course always negative since wNR
f (a;a) = a. Contractual dualism
includes of course the special case of q = 0, where there is a complete absence of minimum
wage enforcement in the informal sector.
16When the minimum wage exceeds a, further increases will of course have no further impact on the w
NR
i (a;  w).
17To see this, note that Vi(w
NR
i (a;  w);a)   ia = a(1   i)   q  w   w(1   i   q) > 0 if q < 1   i as shown,
for all  w  a.
13Assume therefore that indeed q < 1   i, Figure 2 illustrates the three constraints, and
reveals the endogenous division between workers with informal and / or formal sector job
prospects, along with the range of feasible expected wage oers anywhere along the skill spec-
trum a  0. As shown, formal labor demand does not exist for skill levels that are suciently
low (<  w=f), for the set of feasible expected wage oers satisfying all three constraints in the
formal sector is empty. Everywhere else, formal and informal demand for workers co-exist.
In terms of wages, the bold line labeled w+
i (a;  w) in Figure 2 traces out the maximal
informal oers satisfying all three constraints: the FEC (we  wFE
i ), the NRC (we  wNR
i )
and the MWC (we  wMW
i ). The bold line labeled w+
f (a;  w) does the same thing for the
formal sector, incorporating the FEC (we  wFE
f ), the NRC (we  wNR
f ), and the MWC
(we  wMW
f ). Let the maximal oer for skill type a consistent with the application of the
MWC, the FEC and the NRC in both sectors be given by
w+(a;  w) = maxfw+
i (a;  w);w+
f (a;  w)g; (14)
where w+(a;  w) is given by wNR
f , wFE
f , wNR
i , respectively for a >  w=(1 f), a 2 [  w=f;  w=(1 
f)), and a <  w=f. The lower bound informal and formal sector oers from the demand
perspective are wMW
i and wMW
f respectively. As should be expected, contractual dualism is
closely related to a binding NRC in the informal sector. By inspection of Figure 2
Proposition 3 Contractual dualism implies dualism in wages, in the sense that
 the NRC is always binding in the informal sector (w+
i (a;  w) = wNR
i (a;  w)) for all a. The
NRC is binding in the formal sector (w+
f (a;  w) = wNR
f (a;  w)) only at high skill levels,
a >  w=(1   f);
 the highest formal oer strictly exceeds the the highest oer in the informal sector, when-
ever the two sectors co-exist;
 the lowest formal sector oer strictly exceeds the highest informal sector oer for at least
some skill levels if employer's separation risk adjusted discount factor is suciently low
wNR






14With relatively lax government enforcement in the informal sector, all informal contracts must
be self-enforcing if they were to be credible. By contrast, the NRC is binding in the formal
sector with stricter enforcement of the minimum wage only when wages are high, or equivalently
when the skill type is high.
Contractual dualism also endogenously gives rise to wage dualism in the form of higher
wages in the formal sector. This dierence in wage oers is shown here to exist despite the
higher job creation costs in the formal sector, and can be attributed to the dierence in intensity
with which government is able to enforce the minimum wage in the two sectors.
Furthermore, when the separation risk adjusted discount factor E is suciently low,







the range of wages for a given skill level can contain isolated segments. For example, as shown




1 i, at the marginal skill level
a =  w=f where informal and formal work co-exist, formal work pays we 2 [  w;wFE
f (a)], but
informal work can only pay strictly less than the minimum wage we  w+
i (a;  w) = wNR
i (a;  w) <
 w. This is in sharp contrast to the continuous wage distributions typically implied by canonical
search models (e.g. Burdett and Mortensen 1998). Instead, as we will demonstrate, our setting
can imply segmented formal and informal wages, along with a wage spike at the minimum
wage for workers with the same skill type. The height of such a spike in the wage distribution
for any given a, or the economy wide distribution aggregated across all skill types, are both
endogenously determined here (Section 4.2).
By contrast, employers with high bE put stronger emphasis on the need to retain workers
and as such the self-enforcing informal wage wNR
i (a;  w) will be higher. \Over-compliance" in
the informal sector in this case will be a norm, in that whenever formal and informal work
co-exists, there are always some informal employers paying more than the minimum wage. In
what follows we will maintain the assumption that bE is relatively low, so that there are at
least some skill levels where over-compliance is not observed in the informal sector.
18Specically, w
NR
i (a;  w) <  w at a =  w=f if and only if  w > bE  w=f +(1 bE)q  w. Rearranging terms yields
q < (1   f)=f. With contractual dualism, we know that q < (1   i). It follows that q < (1   f)=f if





152.4 Steady State Equilibrium
For each skill type, dene a steady state equilibrium as (i) a match likelihood function H(we;a;
 w),19 (ii) a set of equilibrium formal (
e
f(a;  w)) and informal expected wage oers (
e
i(a;  w))
with positive density, and (iii) levels of equilibrium unemployment U(a;  w), informal employ-
ment N
i (a;  w) and formal employment N
f(a;  w), such that the following equilibrium require-
ments are simultaneously met.
The rst set of equilibrium requirements are the FEC, the NRC and the MWC, and
as discussed these characterize feasible oers from a labor demand perspective. The second
set incorporates labor supply response, so that no wage oer is lower than the reservation
oer we
r(a;  w): for all we 2 
e
f(a;  w), we  we





A third equilibrium requirement allows both formal and informal employers the liberty




i(a) respectively. As such, all formal and informal
contracts with positive probability density yield the same expected prots:
V o
i (we;a;  w) = V o
i ( ^ we;a;  w) (15)




f (we;a;  w) = V o
f (  we;a;  w) (16)




i ( ^ we;a;  w) = V o
f (  we;a;  w) (17)
for any ^ we in 
e
i(a) and  we in 
e
f(a). The nal requirement pins down equilibrium labor
19Note that the equilibrium distribution of oers F
(w
e;a;  w), and the ratio of recruiting employers to
unemployed workers 
(a;  w) = M
(a;  w)=U
(a;  w) can be had once H
(w
e;a;  w) and the lower support of
w





f(a;  w) [ 

e
f(a;  w)g are both determined. Specically, from (3),
H
(w
e;a;  w) = e
(a)(1 F(we;a;  w)); H
(w
e;a;  w) = e
(a):
It follows that F
(w
e;a;  w) = [ln(H
(w




e(a;  w);a;  w)), and 
(a;  w) =
 ln(H
(w
e(a;  w);a;  w):
16allocations. In a steady state, inows into any state of employment must equal outows:
pf(a;  w)U(a;  w) = N
f(a;  w);
[pi(a;  w) + pf(a;  w)]U(a;  w) = [N
i (a;  w) + N
f(a;  w)];
 N(a) = N
f(a;  w) + N
i (a;  w) + U(a;  w) (18)




f(a) dH(we;a;  w) refers to the fraction of unemployed workers accepting




i(a) dH(we;a;  w)
is the fraction accepting an informal sector job. Solving (18), we obtain:
U(a;  w) =
  N(a)
 + pi(a;  w) + pf(a;  w)
; N
i (a;  w) =
pi(a;  w)  N(a)
 + pi(a;  w) + pf(a;  w)
;
N
f(a;  w) =
pf(a;  w)  N(a)
 + pi(a;  w) + pf(a;  w)
: (19)
Thus, the higher the separation frequency , all else equal, the larger will be the equilibrium
unemployment pool. Meanwhile, informal and formal sector employment additionally depend
on the fractions pi(a;  w) and pf(a;  w) of unemployed accepting respectively with an informal
and a formal job.
3 The No Intervention Benchmark
Before proceeding further, a number general remarks about self-enforcing labor contracts are
in order. These will help properly situate contractual dualism as a form of labor market imper-
fection with both distributional and eciency consequences. In turn, the need for government
policy interventions in the labor market can also be better understood.
Consider a labor market equilibrium in the absence of any policy interventions, including
that of a minimum wage. If employers were able to commit ex ante to any wage oers, there
will be no need for self-enforcing contracts, or the NRC. With the FEC as the only remaining
constraint, it follows immediately that the value function of recruiting employers, whether
formal (V o
f (wFE
f ;a;0)) or informal (V o
i (wFE
i ;a;0)), will be equal to zero.
Now if the NRC is a genuine concern, how will equilibrium prots, wage oers, and labor
allocation be aected? Without the possibility of formalization, all contracts are informal, and
all informal contracts are subject to a binding NRC, since the maximal self-enforcing wage is
wNR
i (a;0) = bEa (< bEa + (1   bE)(1   i)a = wFE
i (a)):
17which is but a fraction bE of the full output per worker, and strictly less than the free entry
counterpart wFE
i (a).
This upper bound on wages due to the NRC can be shown to impact expected prots.
Denote  V (a;  w) as the expected prots of employers recruiting a skill type a worker. With a
binding NRC instead of FEC:
V o
i (wNR




  ia = a(1   i) > 0: (20)
We have thus:
Proposition 4 Self-enforcing labor contracting breeds employer market power. Equilibrium
expected prots V o
i (wNR
i (a;0);a;0) fail to dissipate despite the absence of explicit entry barriers:
V o
i (wNR
i (a;0);a;0) = a(1   i) > 0:
In eect, we have here a case whereby the ability of competitive forces to bid up wages is
compromised by the inability of employers to provide a credible promise of such a wage. As
such, employers with an existing labor contract earn positive prots, but new entrants who
may aspire to prot from hiring workers and bidding up wages cannot credibly do so without
violating the NRC.
Turning now to the distribution of oers, expected prot equalization (15) - (17) along
with (9) together imply that the equilibrium match likelihood strikes precisely the right balance
between the cost of a higher wage oer we and the benets of a higher match likelihood
H(we;a;0), respectively for an informal employer oering ^ we 2 
e
i(a):20
H( ^ we;a;0) =
(1   bE)(ia +  V (a;0))
a   ^ we : (21)
Equilibrium market power, with positive instead of zero expected prots  V (a;0) auto-
matically gives rise to a shift in the match likelihood function consistent with lower average
oers from (21):
H(we;a;0) =
(1   bE)(ia +  V (a;0))
a   we =
(1   bE)a
a   we >
(1   bE)ia
a   we
20To see this, note from (15) and (16) that V
o
i (w







e;a;0) =  V (a;0) , H
(w
e;a;0)(a   w
e)=(1   bE)   fa. Rearranging, we obtain (21) as shown.
18where the latter (1 bE)ia=(a we) would have been the equilibrium match likelihood function
had expected prots  V () been driven down to zero. The eect of employer market power thus
reverberates along the entire match likelihood function, consistent with a more pessimistic but
nonetheless rational outlook about job prospects. It follows then from (7) that the reservation
oer we
r(a;0) declines with employer market power.21 Indeed, the higher is the discount factor
N, the larger will be this increase in the reservation oer as the weight that workers put on
future earnings rather than current earnings increases.
Finally, the role of employer market power on equilibrium unemployment U(a;0) thus
depends on the balance between the two aforementioned eects: (i) the shift in H(we;a;0),
and (ii) the corresponding response by workers in their choice of a reservation oer we
r(a;0),
since inow into the employment pool pf(a;0)+pi(a;0) is equivalent to the fraction of workers




1 +    H(we
r(a;0);a;0)
By inspection, a lowering of the reservation expected pay we
r(a;0) thanks to employer market
power tends to decrease unemployment as workers are discouraged from holding out too long
for a high oer. But going in opposite direction, employer market power shifts downwards
the match likelihood function, which directly contributes to raising H(we
r;a;0), and hence
unemployment at constant reservation pay we
r(a;0). On balance, the reservation wage eect
on we
r(a;0) will be weak if the discount factor N is relatively low from (7).23
Summarizing, a low wage, high unemployment equilibrium with informal employer mar-
ket power emerges simply as a consequence of the need for self-enforcing labor contracts. In
equilibrium, the NRC eectively deters the entry of new oers with high wages, and raises
unemployment unless workers respond by making a huge adjustment in the reservation oer
21See Appendix A for a proof of this claim.













i (a;0)] in the absence of a minimum
wage, and hence a formal sector. Specically, since  w = 0, w
 
i (a;0) = w
 
f (a;0) = 0 from the MWC. At




i (a;0) = w
 
f (a;0) = 0. Together









23To see this, recall that
w
e









The role of H
(w
e;a;0) on the reservation oer depends critically on the size of N.
19we
r(a;0). In terms of distribution, the need for self-enforcing contracts shifts income distribu-
tion in favor of employers with an existing worker as expected prots turn positive. In terms of
eciency, the need for self-enforcing contracts lowers total output as unemployment increases.
With these in mind, policy measures that aim at improving upon this no intervention
baseline can be targeted towards allaying distributional inequities between employers and work-
ers, towards improving eciency, or as the case may be, both. In the next section, we examine
a minimum wage, and thus the possibility of formalization, as a potential candidate. Our goal
is to explore the role of a minimum wage on (i) expected employer prots, which we take as
a gauge of the extent of employer market power despite the absence of explicit barriers, (ii)
the equilibrium distribution of oers, from which the equilibrium wage distribution readily fol-
lows, and (iii) the equilibrium allocation of laborers as informal workers, formal workers, and
unemployed workers.
4 Minimum Wage Policy
4.1 Market Power and the Minimum Wage
To better appreciate the role of a minimum wage on employer market power, we reorganize the
information presented in Figure 2 to highlight how successively higher levels of the minimum
wages impact formal and informal labor demand as given by the joint application of the MWC,
the FEC, and the NRC in Figure 3.
The bold lines mark four areas of interest. The area marked ANR
f { an area of low
minimum wages at high skill levels { gives all combinations of  w and a such that the informal
and formal labor demand co-exists (a   w=(1 f)). With the government enforced minimum
wage still relatively low, the NRC in the formal sector is binding, although wNR
f (a;  w) =
bEa + (1   bE)maxf  w;ag already exceeds the no minimum wage baseline at bEa. The area
marked AFE
f covers higher levels of minimum wage. Government enforcement of this higher
wage now improves the credibility of formal contracts so much so that the NRC no longer
binds, and the FEC takes its place a 2 [  w=[bE + (1   bE)(1   f)];  w=(1   f)]. Further
raising this minimum wage to ANR
i results in a complete exodus of employers out of the
formal sector in favor of informality, where enforcement of the high minimum wage is relatively
lax (a 2 [  w=f);  w). With contractual dualism, the NRC is binding for all such informal
20employers.24
As the relative importance of the MWC, FEC, and NRC varies as  w rises and traverses
from one area to the next, the maximal oer w+(a;  w) consistent with the MWC, FEC, and the
NRC changes endogenously as well from (14). Naturally, therefore, employer prots changes
with  w as well. As with (20) in Section 3.1, let  V (a;  w) denote the value function of the
employer with the highest oer, where
 V (a;  w) = V o
i (w+(a;  w);a;  w) =
a   w+(a;  w)
1   bE
  ia
if w+(a;  w) = w+
i (a;  w) is oered in the informal sector. Otherwise,
 V (a;  w) = V o
f (w+(a;  w);a;  w) =
a   w+(a;  w)
1   bE
  fa
Of course, in equilibrium,  V (a;  w) is equal to expected prot of all employers with wage oers
supported by H(we;a;  w) from (15) - (17). We have:
Proposition 5 With contractual dualism,
 Expected prot  V (a;  w) = a    w   fa is strictly positive for all (a;  w) 2 ANR
f despite no
explicit barriers to entry. A further increase in  w lowers  V (a;  w)
 Expected prot  V (a;  w) is at zero for all (a;  w) 2 AFE
f . A further increase in  w has no
local eect on  V (a;  w).
 Transitioning from AFE
f to ANR
i , there is a discrete upward jump in expected prots at
 w = a=f as all formal employers become informalized at we > a=f. A further increase
in  w will decrease expected prot  V (a;  w) = a   q  w   ia if and only if q > 0.
The relationship between employer prots and the minimum wage is thus non-monotonic and
u-shaped. As shown in Figures 4a and 4b , at low levels of  w, raising  w unleashes competitive
forces previously held back by the NRC, and helps keep equilibrium employer market power in
check by enabling formal employers to make credible high wage oers. The smallest minimum
wage that completely eliminates employer market power is  w = a(1   f), while the smallest
24Minimum wages in the remaining area are strictly higher than a and are thus outside of the feasible range
( u;a) = (0;a).
21minimum wage that gives rise full informality is  w = fa. Thereafter, employer prots expe-
rience a discrete improvement due to lax enforcement of the minimum wage in the informal
sector. The ability of the minimum wage to curb employer prots after this point will depend
critically on the size of q. Clearly, further raising the minimum wage beyond a will produce no
further results either in terms of curbing employer market power, or raising equilibrium wage
oerings.
These results have direct implications on the equilibrium match likelihoods facing unem-
ployed workers, and by implication the equilibrium wage distribution among employed workers
as well.25 We turn to these next.
4.2 The Wage Distribution
From the equilibrium equal prot requirement, the match likelihood function is given as in (21)
as
H( ^ we;a;  w) =
(1   bE)(ia +  V (a;  w))
a   ^ we ; H( ~ we;a;  w) =
(1   bE)(fa +  V (a;  w))
a   ~ we
respectively for ^ we 2 
e
i(a;  w), and ~ we 2 
e
f(a;  w). This indicates clearly that rising equilibrium
employer prots  V (a;  w) are associated with backward shifts in the entire match likelihood
function, consistent with lower average wage matches. It follows immediately from Proposition
5 that the minimum wage, via its impact on expected employer prots  V (a;  w), can have
interesting and non-monotonic impact on the match likelihood function.
Our task here involves tracking both the height and shape of the match likelihood func-
tion as the minimum wage changes. To do so we rst note two observations. First, recall from
Figure 2 that the size of the minimum wage determines whether formal and informal demand
25Information on H
(w
e;a;  w) has direct implications on the realized expected wage distribution in the steady
state. Let G
(w
e;a;  w) denote the expected wage distribution among employed workers. In a steady state,
outow of workers from the pool of employed workers earning less than w
e equals inow, and thus:
G
(w
e;a;  w)(1   U
(a;  w)) = [H
(w






f(a;  w) dH
(w




f(a;  w) dH
(w
e;a;  w), to recall, are the fraction of unem-
ployed workers receiving a job oer in the two sectors. Rearranging, we have:
G
(w
e;a;  w) =
pf(a;  w) + pi(a;  w) + H
(w
e;a;  w)   1




f ), or where only informal employers remain (ANR
i ). Second, with co-
existence, there is furthermore the question of whether there exist informal employers that
over-comply with the minimum wage legislation. This occurs when the maximal self-enforcing
informal wage exceeds the minimum wage, or
w+
i (a;  w) = wNR




1   (1   bE)q
(< a):
Henceforth we assume that the discount factor bE is suciently small, so that bEa=(1   (1  
bE)q) < 1 f as shown via the dotted line in Figure 3. It follows that for all  w  bEa=(1 (1 
bE)q), informal demand is strong enough to support over-complying employers. By contrast,
for all  w > bEa=(1 (1 bE)q), the highest informal sector oer is lower than the lowest formal
sector oer at  w. For all such minimum wage and skill type pairings, the match likelihood
functions exhibits segmented formal and informal wages, along with a spike at the minimum
wage.




i can now be easily obtained. Starting with  w < bEa
1 (1 bE)q, where the NRC is binding in the
formal sector, we have from Proposition 5 that expected prots is  V (a;  w) = a   w fa. As in
(21), expected prot equalization implies the following equilibrium match likelihood function:26





i (we;a;  w) =
(1   bE)(a    w   (f   i)a)
a   we ; we  wNR
i (a;  w)
H
f(we;a;  w) =
(1   bE)(a    w)
a   we ; we 2 (wNR
i (a;  w);wNR
f (a;  w)]:
The two segments respectively give the match likelihoods facing informal sector workers at low
wages we  wNR
i (a;  w), and formal sector workers at wages higher than wNR
i (a;  w) (Figures 2
and 3). From Proposition 5, a minimum wage hike  w in this range decreases employer expected
prots. Accordingly, the same minimum wage hike gives rise to a rst order stochastically
dominating (rightward) shift in the match likelihood function consistent with higher wage oer
expectations.
26With higher job creation cost in the formal sector, an oer generates higher informal prots than for-
mal prots so long as w
e is feasible, or w
e  w
NR
i (a;  w) since V
o
i (w
e;a;  w) = H
(w
e;a;  w)Vi(w




e;a)   fa = V
o
f (w
e;a;  w). Thus, all employers oering less than w
NR
i (a;  w) are informal
employers.
23Raising  w, so a(1   f) >  w > bEa
1 (1 bE)q, the equilibrium match likelihood function is
H(we;a;  w) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
H
i (we;a;  w) =
(1   bE)(a    w   (f   i)a)
a   we ; we  wNR
i (a;  w)
H
o(we;a;  w) =
a    w   (f   i)a
a   q  w
; we 2 (wNR
i (a;  w);  w)
H
f(we;a;  w) =
(1   bE)(a    w)
a   we ; we 2 [  w;wNR
f (a;  w)]:
The intermediate segment H
o(we;a;  w) = H
i (wNR
i (a;  w);a;  w) for we 2 (wNR
i (a;  w);  w) rep-
resents the range of wages too high for informal employers, but too low for formal employ-
ers with a mandated minimum wage. The height of the minimum wage spike is given by
H
f(  w;a;  w)   H
i (wNR
i (a;  w);a;  w) = 1   bE   (a    w   (f   i)a)=(a   q  w). Table 1 summa-
rizes the rest of the match likelihood functions obtained in analogous fashion. Proposition 6
below summarizes the match likelihood impact of the minimum wage, which reects directly
the expected prot impact of a minimum wage already seen in Proposition 5:
Proposition 6 With contractual dualism, and a suciently small discount factor bE such that
bEa=(1   (1   bE)q) < 1   f
 For (a;  w) 2 ANR
f and  w suciently small ( bEa=[1 (1 bE)a], some informal employers
over-comply (wNR
i (a;  w) >  w). An increase in  w shifts H(we;a;  w) to the right.
 Next, for (a;  w) 2 ANR
f and  w 2 [bEa=[1   (1   bE)a];a(1   f), H(we;a;  w) exhibits a
spike at  w. An increase in  w likewise shifts the match likelihood function H(we;a;  w) to
the right.
 Now for all (a;  w) 2 AFE
f , H(we;a;  w) exhibits a spike at  w. An increase in  w gives rise
to a single crossing shift of H(we;a;  w) with crossing from above if and only if q > 0,
and a rightward shift of H(we;a;  w) otherwise.
 Transitioning from AFE
f to ANR
i there is a discrete shift in the distribution leftwards as
all formal employers become informalized. Further increases in  w will shift H(we;a;  w)
to the right if and only if q > 0, and H(we;a;  w) is invariant to  w otherwise.
Figures 5 and 6 summarize these observations and illustrate the equilibrium match likeli-
hood functions for successively higher levels of the minimum wage, given a, and q > 0 in Figure
245, and q = 0 in Figure 6. As shown, at low levels of the minimum wage (Figure 5a and 6a)
((  w;a) 2 ANR
f ), the formal NRC and the informal NRC are both binding. Here, formal and
informal job oers co-exist, and there is over-compliance in the informal sector. An increase in
the minimum wage lowers expected employer prots, and shifts the match likelihood function
to the right from Ho where  w = 0, to H1 and then to H2 for successively higher levels of  w > 0.
Higher minimum wages eventually generate a spike at the  w for (  w;a) 2 AFE
f . An
increase in the minimum wage now shifts the formal wage associated with the spike, in such
a way that the match likelihood H(  w;a;  w) evaluated at the new minimum wage is exactly
the same as before the minimum wage hike, consistent with the FEC (Figures 5b and 6b).
Meanwhile, a higher minimum wage raises the credibility of higher wage oers in the informal
sector so long as q > 0. This raises the maximal informal oer as well. The result is a single-
crossing shift in H(we;a;  w) as stated in Proposition 6, and shown in Figures 5b and 6b via
the shift from H3 to H4.
Still higher levels of the minimum wage yields a discrete transition to a match likelihood
function with informal oers only. With relatively lax enforcement, employers preserve their
market power here, and the ability of further increases in the minimum wage in raising wage
prospects in the informal sector depends critically on q. In Figures 5c and 6c, we illustrate the
two match likelihood functions (H4 and H5) respectively before and after the transition eval-
uated at the marginal minimum wage  w = af. Thereafter, further increases in the minimum
wage with a strictly positive enforcement likelihood in the informal sector q gives rise to a shift
from H5 to H6 in Figure 5c. Otherwise, with q = 0, H() is invariant to further increases in
the minimum wage as in Figure 6c.
In sum, the minimum wage can have impact throughout the entire match likelihood
function both above and below the minimum wage in very nuanced ways. To complete our
specication of the match likelihood function, a characterization of the equilibrium range of
oers with positive density (
e
f(a;  w) and 
e
i(a;  w)) is critical. Doing so requires incorporat-
ing supply side considerations, which will also provide the labor allocation implications of a
minimum wage.
254.3 Employment, Unemployment and the Optimal Minimum Wage
Recall that in a steady state equilibrium,
U(a;  w) =
  N(a)
 + pi(a;  w) + pf(a;  w)
; N
i (a;  w) =
pi(a;  w)  N(a)
 + pi(a;  w) + pf(a;  w)
;
N
f(a;  w) =
pf(a;  w)  N(a)
 + pi(a;  w) + pf(a;  w)
:
These steady state labor allocations are determined as soon as the share of unemployed workers










are determined. Thus, apart from its impact on the match likelihood H(we;a;  w) discussed
in Proposition 6, a minimum wage can impact equilibrium labor allocation by changing the









i have already been discussed, and are
bounded above by w+
i (a;  w) and w+
f (a;  w) depending on the juxtaposition of the NRC, and
the FEC. This leaves the lower support associated with 
e
i(a;  w) and 
e
f(a;  w), respectively
w 
i (a;  w) and w 
f (a;  w). Combining the MWC on the informal demand side, and we  we
r(a;  w)
as the labor supply constraint, the minimum oer in the informal sector w 
i (a;  w) is
w 
i (a;  w) = minfwejwe 2 
e
i(a;  w)g = maxfq  w;we
r(a;  wgg (22)
where the lower support of informal wages is given either by the government enforced q minf  w;ag,
or the reservation oer we
r(a;  w), whichever is smaller.
In the formal sector, w 
f (a;  w) depends on the juxtaposition of the MWC on the formal
demand side (we   w),27 the possibility of over-compliance in the informal sector (w+
i (a;  w) 
 w) already discussed (when bEa=[1 + (1   bE)q]   w), as well as the labor supply constraint
we  we
r(a;  w). Thus,
w+
f (a;  w) = maxf  w;wNR
i (a;  w);we
r(a;  w)g: (23)
It follows that only formal employment prevails in equilibrium if w+
f (a;  w) = we
r(a;  w),
or when workers value highly the returns from potentially a more prolonged wait for a formal
oer. Clearly, the higher N is, the more likely this will be the case. We are now in a position to
27Recall from our discussion of Proposition 5 and Figure 2 that only informal employers can sustain employ-
ment when minimum wages higher than a. Thus, the MWC on the formal demand side is w
e  minf  w;ag =  w
as shown.
26address the labor allocation consequences of a minimum wage. We begin with this preliminary
observation:
Proposition 7 For all (a;  w) 2 ANR
i (  w), there is no formal employment, while the range of
informal wage oers with strictly positive density is

e
i(a;  w) = [maxfq  w;we
r(a;  wgg;wNR
i (a;  w)]:
Otherwise for all (a;  w) 2 AFE
f [ANR
f , formal and informal employment co-exist, and the range
of formal wage oers with strictly positive density is

e
f(a;  w) = [maxf  w;wNR
i (a;  w)g;w+
f (a;  w)]:
if N is suciently small.
Table 2 follows Proposition 7 and assumes that N is suciently small, so as to allow us to
focus on situations where both formal and informal employment are prevalent. Equilibrium
labor allocations associated with each of the subsets ANR
i , AFE
i and ANR
f are displayed and
the comparative statics of a minimum wage is summarized.
Right away, it is not dicult to see that a minimum wage introduces opposing forces
that can either raise or decrease unemployment. In particular, from Proposition 6, a higher
minimum wage leads to higher wage expectations. This raises the lower support w 
i (a;  w), and
thus unemployment through H(w 
i (a;  w);a;  w) as workers are encouraged to wait for a better
job. The only exception is for a 2 AFE
f , where the credibility is enhanced for both higher
paying formal job oers and lower paying informal job oers for strictly positive q > 0. Going
in opposite direction, an increase in the minimum wage raises the credibility of high oers,
decreasing unemployment along the way as it shifts H(we;a;  w) to the right.
In view of these observations, Table 2 summarizes the comparative statics of a minimum
wage hike in all four subsets, capturing unemployment, informal employment, formal employ-
ment, as well as the number of workers paid at exactly the minimum wage,  Nf(a;  w). This
is done based on the following set of assumptions. First, workers' discount rate E is not too
high, so that informal and formal employment co-exist, and also so that the impact of future
wage expectations on current reservation oer is not too high (equation 7). Second, the en-
forcement intensity of the minimum wage in the informal sector is suciently small consistent
27with contractual dualism. This guarantees that the credibility eect of a minimum wage hike
is more focussed on formal labor contracts. Summarizing the results presented in Table 2:28
Proposition 8 If E and N are not too high, and if q is likewise suciently small,
 there is a u-shaped relationship between equilibrium unemployment U(a;  w) and the min-
imum wage. The unemployment minimizing minimum wage coincides with the smallest
minimum wage that eliminates employer market power, a(1   f).
 there is a U-shaped relationship between equilibrium informal employment N
i (a;  w) and
the minimum wage.
 equilibrium total formal employment N
f(a;  w), and formal employment at the minimum
wage N
f(a;  w) rst rises, and eventually falls with successively higher levels of the mini-
mum wage.
The driving force behind Proposition 8 highlights once again the dual role of a minimum
wage that is already evident in our discussion of Proposition 5. Government enforcement of the
minimum wage relaxes the NRC, and by so doing it presents a partial solution to the low wage,
high unemployment problem inherent in labor contracting with a self-enforcing constraint.
But raising the minimum wage too high runs the risk of encouraging informalization, where lax
enforcement once again accommodates employer market power, and a return to a low wage-
high unemployment equilibrium.
In summary, the model we proposed generates a number of predictions that are in line
with the salient features of the informal labor market outlined in the introduction: the co-
existence of formal and informal work, wage dualism and in particular wage spikes along the
distribution depending on the minimum wage, co-movements between the informal wage and
the minimum wage depending on the level of enforcement, and nally a very nuanced set of
comparative statics response related to the minimum wage impact on labor allocations.
The model also generates sharp implications concerning the choice of a minimum wage.
From the discussion following Proposition 5 and also from Proposition 8, the minimum wage
28See Appendix B for a proof of this proposition.
28that minimizes employer expected prots, while maximizing total informal and formal employ-
ment follows a remarkably simple and intuitive formula:  w  a(1   f). In the absence of
formal sector job creation costs, the minimum wage  w = a coincides with the Stigler (1946)
prescription, where the employment maximizing minimum wage is simply the marginal value
product of labor in an otherwise competitive labor market. Thus, the higher the productivity,
the higher the minimum wage should be. But with a positive cost of formalization,  w rules out
full marginal productivity pricing. Being based both on productivity and job creation costs,
implicit in this formula is the implication that  w need not even meet the poverty line. To
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst that a provides a link between the cost of
formalization f, and the formulation of an optimal minimum wage that eliminates employer
market power, and maximizes employment.
To establish a raw gauge on the importance of entry cost in the determination of the
optimal minimum wage, consider for example data collected regarding the regulation cost of
entry of start-up rms in 85 developed and developing countries from Djankov et. al (2002).
The data cover the number of procedures, ocial time, and ocial cost that a start-up must
bear before it can operate legally. The direct and time cost of entry is expressed as a fraction of
GDP per capita in 1999 { a proxy of our f. As reported in Djankov et. al (2002), these entry
costs are indeed substantial in many countries, with an average f of 0:66 and median f of
0:40. Thus, the optimal minimum wage that minimizes unemployment is indeed substantially
smaller than the Stiglerian prediction.
5 Conclusion
This paper models the conuence of three strands of the literature on formality and infor-
mality in developing countries { the degree of competition in the labor market, the ease of
labor contract enforcement, and government regulation of wages. We present an equilibrium
where workers and rms sign contracts that will not be reneged upon; and rms can choose
between the formal sector, where minimum wage regulations are strongly enforced, and the
informal sector, where they are only weakly enforced. We show that this model is able to
account jointly for a number of stylized facts on wages and labor in developing countries. We
demonstrate conditions under which employer power is greater in the informal sector because
29of non-enforceable contracts. In the formal sector enforcement of minimum wage regulation
indirectly provides a partial commitment technology, thereby improving eciency and equity
in some ranges. Finally, we derive the optimal minimum wage taking into account the full
equilibrium repercussions in both sectors.
To conclude, let us emphasize again that two conventional characterizations of the infor-
mal sector { that it is more competitive and that it has greater diculty of contract enforcement
{ are incompatible with each other. Greater diculty of contract enforcement in our model
leads to greater employer power in the informal sector. Paradoxical as it may seem, government
regulation mitigates the potential for employer power by providing a technology of third party
enforcement, whose eects spill over to the informal sector and can lead to greater eciency
and greater equity in the economy as a whole.
30Table 1. The Minimum Wage and the Match Likelihood Function
(a;  w) 2 ANR
f and  w  bEa=(1   (1   bE)q)
H(we;a;  w) = H
i (we;a;  w) = (1   bE)(a    w   (f   i)a)=(a   we); we  wNR
i
H
f(we;a;  w) = (1   bE)(a    w)=(a   we); we 2 (wNR
i ;wNR
f ]:
(a;  w) 2 ANR
f and  w > bEa=(1   (1   bE)q)
H(we;a;  w) = H
i (we;a;  w) = (1   bE)(a    w   (f   i)a)=(a   we), we  wNR
i
H
o(we;a;  w) = (a    w   (f   i)a)=(a   q  w), we 2 (wNR
i ;  w)
H
f(we;a;  w) = (1   bE)(a    w)=(a   we), we 2 [  w;wNR
f ].
(a;  w) 2 AFE
f
H(we;a;  w) = H
i (we;a;  w) = (1   bE)ia=(a   we), we  wNR
i
H
o(we;a;  w) = ia=(a   q  w), we 2 (wNR
i ;  w)
H
f(we;a;  w) = (1   bE)fa=(a   we), we 2 [  w;wFE
f ].
(a;  w) 2 ANR
i
H(we;a;  w) = H
i (we;a;  w) = (1   bE)(a   q  w)=(a   we); we  wNR
i (a)
ANR
f = f(a;  w)ja   w=(1   f)g; AFE
f = f(a;  w)ja   w=fg, and ANR
i = f(a;  w)ja 2 [  w=f);  wg:
31Table 2. Expected Prots, Equilibrium Labor Allocation and the Minimum Wage29
Coexistence of Transition from Informal
Informal and Coexistence to Employment
Employment Informal Only Only
(a;  w) 2 ANR
f (a;  w) 2 AFE
f )  w = fa (a;  w) 2 ANR
i
 w < (1   f)a  w 2 [(1   f)a;fa)  w 2 (fa;a]
 V (a;  w)
< 0 no change lim!0[ V (a;fa + ) < 0 if q > 0
  V (a;fa   )] > 0 no change if q = 0
U(a;  w)
< 0 > 0 lim!0[U(a;fa + ) < 0 or no change if q > 0
 U(a;fa   )] > 0 no change if q = 0
N
i (a;  w)
< 0 > 0 lim!0[N
i (a;fa + ). pos. if q > 0
 N
i (a;fa   )] > 0 no change if q = 0
N
f(a;  w) > 0 < 0 lim!0[N
f(a;fa + ) -
 N
f(a;fa   )] < 0
 N
f(a;  w) > 0 > 0 lim!0[  N
f(a;fa + ) -
   N
f(a;fa   )] < 0
*If  w > bEa=(1   (1   bE)q).
Appendix A
We demonstrate here that in the absence of a minimum wage legislation, heightened employer market
power in the presence of a binding NRC decreases the reservation wage as dened in (7). To this end,
suppose to begin with that employers are able to commit ex ante to refrain from reneging on an agreed
upon wage contract. The NRC is no longer warranted, and employer prots are driven to zero from the
FEC. It follows therefore from (21) that
H(we;a;0) =
(1   bE)ia
a   we :
Furthermore, in the absence of an NRC,
w
+
i (a;0) = wFE
i (a) = bEa + (1   bE)(1   i)a:
Let the corresponding reservation wage be ^ we
r(a;  w), where from (7), upon integrating by parts:
^ we





i (a)   ^ we







a   we dwe
#
:
29The equilibrium employer prots  V (a;  w) has been demonstrated in Proposition 5. From Section 4.3, equilib-
rium labor allocations are given by: U
(a;  w) = =, N









i (a;  w);a;  w))=,
N





i (a;  w);a;  w))=, and  N
f(a;  w) = (H





i (a;  w);a;  w)= where
 = [1 +    H
(w
 
i (a;  w);a;  w)]=  N(a).
32Suppose instead that employers are unable to commit, and the NRC is binding. It follows that
w
+
i (a;0) = wNR
i (a;0) = bEa:
Employer prots are now strictly positive, and
H(we;a;0) =
(1   bE)a
a   we :
Let the corresponding reservation wage be ~ we
r(a), where:
~ we





i (a)      ^ we






(1   bE)ia + 
a   we dwe
#
where   (1   bE)(1   i)a > 0. It follows immediately upon routine dierentiation that ~ we
r(a;  w) is
strictly decreasing in , or equivalently, a binding NRC, and the corresponding employer market power















is proportional to N, all else equal. Thus, the higher the discount factor N, the larger will be the
reduction in the reservation oer in the presence of employer market power.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 8: We begin with the following result:
Lemma 1 1. There exists a ^ N 2 [0;1] such that for all N < ^ N, 
e
i(a;  w) is nonempty and
w
 
i (a;  w) = maxfq  w;we
r(a;  w)g < wNR
i (a;  w). 2. The reservation oer we
r(a;  w) is always monoton-
ically increasing in  w for (a;  w) 2 ANR
f , ANR
i , and monotonically increasing in  w for (a;  w) 2 AFE
f if q
is suciently small. 3. For any (a;  w) pair, @we
r(a;  w)=@  w ! 0 as N ! 0.
Proof:












Three observations follow: (i) (we
r) is monotonically decreasing in we
r and N respectively, (ii)
(w+(a;  w)) = 0, and (iii) (0) > 0. Thus,
w+(a;  w)   (w+(a;  w)) > 0; and 0   (0) < 0:
It follows that the implicit solution to (7), we
r(a;  w), is unique, and lies in the interval [0;w+(a;  w)]:
Furthermore, routine dierentiation shows that we
r(a;  w) is monotonically increasing in N, with
we
r(a;  w) ! 0 as N ! 0. Dene
^ N = maxfN 2 [0;1]jwe
r(a;  w)  wNR
i (a;  w)g:
By monotonicity of we
r(a;  w) with respect to N, ^ N is uniquely dened. Furthermore, for any
 < ^ N, we
r(a;  w) < wNR
i (a;  w), and 
e
i(a) = [maxfq  w;we
r(a;  w)g;wNR
i (a;  w)] is thus non-empty.
332. Assuming rst that N < ^ N so that informal and formal employment co-exist from Lemma 1.1,
it follows from (7) upon integrating by parts that for (a;  w) 2 ANR


















a   wedweg  0 (24)
if and only if N  0. The cases of (a;  w) 2 ANR
i (  w), AFE
i (  w) and ANR
i (a) can be analogously
obtained by routine dierentiation, upon integration (7) by parts.
3. This follows directly from (24) above, where by inspection @we
r()=@  w ! 0 if N ! 0.
Henceforth, we consider N suciently small, and in particular N < ^ N, such that 
e
i(a;  w)
is nonempty and w
 
i (a;  w) = maxfq  w;we
r(a;  w)g < wNR
i (a;  w). Furthermore, recall that w
+
i (a;  w) =
wNR
i (a;  w). Thus,





dH(we;a;  w) = H
i (wNR
i (a;  w);a;  w)   H
i (w
 
i (a;  w);a;  w);





dH(we;a;  w) = 1   H
i (wNR
i (a;  w);a;  w):
From (19),




i (a;  w) =
H
i (wNR
i (a;  w);a;  w)   H
i (w
 




f(a;  w) =
1   H
i (wNR
i (a;  w);a;  w)

; (26)
where  = [1 +    H(w
 
i (a;  w);a;  w)]=  N(a). In addition, the number of workers paid exactly the
minimum wage is given by
 N
f(a;  w) =
H
f(  w;a;  w)   H
i (wNR
i (a;  w);a;  w)

(27)
when formal and informal employment co-exist, and when  w > bEa=(1 (1 bE)q) as noted in Section
5 and Figure 3.
Our objective is to demonstrate Proposition 8 by conrming, entry-by-entry, the comparative
statics responses displayed in Table 2. The expected employer prots response to a minimum wage has
already been shown in Proposition 5. What remain to be demonstrated are the responses of unemploy-
ment U(a;  w), informal employment N
i (a;  w), formal employment N
f(a;  w), and the equilibrium size
of the spike at the minimum wage  N
f(a;  w) subsequent to a minimum wage hike.
In what follows, we demonstrate the comparative statics responses displayed in the second and
fourth column of Table 2. These are respectively the case of coexisting formal and informal employ-
ment, ANR
f , and the transition from coexistence to informal employment only. The comparative statics
responses displayed in the third and fth column can be shown in analogous fashion, and are available
upon request.
Coexistence of Formal and Informal Employment (ANR
f )
To begin with, consider minimum wages that are suciently small, so that (a;  w) 2 ANR
f , or  w <
a(1   f). From Table 1, we have
H(we;a;  w) =

H
i (we;a;  w) = (1   bE)(a    w   (f   i)a)=(a   we); we  wNR
i
H
f(we;a;  w) = (1   bE)(a    w)=(a   we); we 2 (wNR
i ;wNR
f ]:
34Unemployed Workers. For N suciently small, w
 
i (a;  w) = maxfq  w;we
r(a;  w)g. Suppose therefore
that w
 




i (a;  w);a;  w) =
(1   bE)(a    w   (f   i)a




i (a;  w);a;  w) is strictly decreasing in the minimum wage  w. From (25), it follows that
U(a;  w) is likewise strictly decreasing in  w.
Suppose instead that w
 
i (a;  w) = we




i (a;  w);a;  w) =




Now from (29) and Lemma 1.3, H(w
 
i (a;  w);a;  w) is strictly decreasing in the minimum wage  w if N
is suciently small. From (25), it follows that U(a;  w) is likewise strictly decreasing in  w.
Taken together, equilibrium unemployment is always strictly decreasing with respect to  w for all
(a;  w) 2 ANR
f so long as N is suciently small.
Informal Workers. From Lemma 1,
pi(a;  w) = H
i (wNR
i (a;  w);a;  w)   H
i (w
 
i (a;  w);a;  w)
=
(1   bE)(a    w   (f   i)a)
a   wNR
i (a;  w)
 
(1   bE)(a    w   (f   i)a)
a   w
 
i (a;  w)
: (30)
From (30), pi(a;  w) is strictly decreasing with respect to  w if w
 
i (a;  w) = q  w. If instead w
 
i (a;  w) =
we
r(a;  w, it follows from Lemma 1.2 and 1.3 that pi(a;  w) continues to be strictly decreasing with respect
to  w if N is suciently small.
From (30) as well as (28) and (29) above, it can be readily veried that N
i (a;  w) is strictly
decreasing with respect to  w for all (a;  w) 2 ANR
f so long as N is suciently small.
Formal Employment. From (29) and (30) above, since equilibrium unemployment and informal em-
ployment are both decreasing with respect to  w, formal employment must rise with the minimum wage.
Minimum Wage Workers. As shown in Section 5 and Figure 3, a spike at the minimum wage occurs
whenever  w > bEa=(1 (1 bE)q). From (26), the number of workers earning higher than the minimum
wage is
N
f(a;  w)    N
f(a;  w) =
1   H






From (31) above, it follows straightforwardly that the number of workers earning higher than the mini-
mum wage N
f(a;  w)   N
f(a;  w) is strictly decreasing in  w. Since N
f(a;  w) rises with the minimum wage
as shown above, it must be the case that the number of workers earning exactly the minimum wage
rises with the minimum wage.
Transition
As the minimum wage rises beyond the critical threshold af, there is full informalization as shown in
Proposition 5. To determine the direction of the discrete change in equilibrium labor allocation, use




i (w (a;af + );a;af + )   H
i (w (a;af   );a;af   )
= (1   bE)(a   afq)=(a   w (a;af))   (1   bE)ia=(a   w (a;af))
35Suppose that N is suciently small, so that we




i (w (a;af + );a;af + )   H
i (w (a;af   );a;af   )
= (1   bE)(a   qfa)=(a   qfa)   (1   bE)ia=(a   qfa))
= (1   bE)a(1   i   qf)=(a   qfa) > 0: (32)
under the assumption of contractual dualism, or, q < 1 i. From (32), it follows that there is a discrete
increase in equilibrium unemployment as the minimum wage rises beyond af, with lim!0 U(af +
)   U(a;af   ) > 0.
Now turning to informal employment, consider now the following dierence, supposing once again
that N is suciently small, so that we





i (a;af + )   H





i (a;af   )   H
i (w (a;af   );a;af   )]
= 1  









bEa(1   i   qf)
a   afq
> 0 (33)
under the assumption of contractual dualism, q < 1   i. From (33), as well as (32) above, it follows
that there is a discrete increase in equilibrium informal employment as the minimum wage rises beyond
af, with lim!0 N
i (af + )   N
i (a;af   ) > 0.
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